

# The four security dilemmas of critical maritime infrastructure protection (CMIP)

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


# Introduction

- Critical maritime infrastructure vulnerabilities
- Nordstream pipeline sabotage a wake-up call
  - ‘the network of underwater cables and pipes on which Europe’s power and communications depend were not built to withstand the “hybrid warfare” being pursued by Moscow and other NATO adversaries.’
    - Vice Admiral Didier Maletierre, deputy commander NATO MARCOM
- Military responses risk escalation and classic security dilemma
  - Attempt to increase own security can make others more insecure, prompting escalation
- CMIP: unlike military security
  - Offshore infrastructure is essentially undefended
  - Offensive actions likely to be grey zone attacks
  - Defence is almost impossible, offense has a major advantage
- Paper identifies four other distinct security dilemmas in CMIP
  - Not military escalation, but making the thing one is trying to secure more insecure



'Old' North Sea energy infrastructure



— Oil and gas pipelines\*    • Oil- and gasfields


LNG import terminals

◆ Operating    ◆ Under construction or planned  
◆ Speculative

## 1. The Dilemma of Mapping

- Publishing infrastructure locations aids coordination but may guide attackers
- Current mapping patchy and inconsistent
- Dilemma complicated by range of public and private stakeholders
- “Almost 200 Russian ships suspected of spying in the North Sea”

'New' North Sea energy infrastructure



Offshore wind farms

■ Operating    ■ In progress or application  
■ Concept or development/auction areas

Hydrogen-electrolyser projects

● Operating    ● In progress or application

Carbon-capture projects

● Operating    ● Under development or planned

— Submarine cables\*    ■ Energy islands† (planned)




## 2. The Dilemma of Surveillance

- Enhancing monitoring, especially if militarized, could provoke escalation
- Spectrum of choices
  - additional commercial telemetry, shared
  - active military sensors
- E.g. Belgian government
  - putting cameras on windfarms
  - 'drone in a box'
- Infrastructure status (military, civilian, critical) may affect perceptions and target picture



### 3. The Dilemma of Cost

- In non-war conditions, key factor is cost rather than existential security
- Security measures add costs in an already challenging economic environment
- Perception of risk alone can deter investors and push up insurance costs
- Example: Lithuania cancels offshore wind tender citing geopolitical risk
  - Energy Minister Dainius Kreivys
  - “geopolitical situation in our region”
  - offshore wind market has “changed dramatically and investors face many obstacles”





## 4: The Dilemma of Securitization

- Securitization: Discursive construction of threats to enable action
- Dilemma: Talking up threats may reveal vulnerabilities to adversaries
  - And may reveal most critical/valued infrastructure
  - May push up risk/risk perception/costs
- But, companies need clear signal of threat to justify security investments
- Stakeholder discussions
  - may helpfully raise awareness
  - or unhelpfully hype threat

# Areas for future research

- Costs and security
  - Some energy companies already used to danger (e.g. Middle East, Nigeria)
  - How to factor risk into renewables locations?
  - Renewable energy nationalism vs. global market
- Information sharing platform competition
  - State systems, NATO, EU, private sector
  - Extra business costs of reporting
  - Who will share what with whom?
  - Who benefits?
    - E.g. intelligence use – build picture of ‘normal’ to know ‘exceptional’
    - Or sharing alerts with stakeholders? (like shipping)
- Securitization dynamics among stakeholders
  - State designations/non-designations of threat
  - Company interactions with states re. threat
  - Interactions within companies re. security investment

